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The US Army and the Special Operations Command have made an effort to recognize the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and are working to emerge from the recent conflicts a more adaptable, capable and agile force. The entire military profession understands that the future holds a multitude of challenges, some which the military and the nation are prepared to face, and many which will require growth and adaptation to
overcome. An initiative that places the human component, the art of war, at the forefront of conflict as a human domain is already well underway within the Army and the Special Operations communities. While this initiative is a positive and necessary step, it is neither radical nor far reaching enough to help generate a true revolution in military thought. Accordingly, doctrine must be revised to incorporate the concept of a Human Realm to unify endeavors and face the uncertain challenges of a future environment that will be dominated, as it always has been, by humanity. The coming decades may require advances in military science, but they will demand a revolution in the art of war.
Being Human Beings: The Domains and a Human Realm
Did ever man believe in the existence of human things, and not human beings?
-Socrates
If the history of warfare teaches anything, it is that war is both art and science.
The science of war is the battlefield calculus, the engineered systems and the established doctrine that guides the employment of forces and weapons. But what is the art of war? The experience and intuition of a commander, the esprit-de-corps of an army, the resiliency of a population; this nebulous, human component is the art. It recognizes the critical and central role humanity plays in war, yet it is repeatedly the most overlooked and least understood factor. Sun Tzu recognized that war surpassed the mere maneuvering of forces and consisted of a human component beyond the control of a general composed of mental, moral, physical and circumstantial factors. 1 He also understood that the human component is far more unpredictable and vital than the basic battlefield calculus normally prescribed too. Clausewitz accounted for this human component in his writings. He described war as an object suspended between the three magnets of the people, the armed forces and the government. Some of the blame for this oversight could be attributed to the exhaustion that follows protracted conflicts. The Roman historian Tacitus said, "The profession of the soldier is forgotten in a quiet peace, and peace reduces the enterprising and indolent to an equality." 6 But most of the fault must lie with the military profession, resistant to move towards the nebulous concepts of the art of war and instead relapsing into the comfort of the military sciences. The scientific philosopher Thomas Kuhn understood the difficulty in enacting revolutionary change in a conservative organization when the organization is accustomed to using a set framework, or paradigm, to solve problems. 7 He stated that a conservative mindset will only be abandoned, causing a "paradigm shift" or revolution to occur, when a crisis causes a lack of confidence in the existing framework. 8 The recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the uncertain environment The "…operational environment encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these areas are all enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation." 10 In framing the operational environment, the organization must "…identify motivations and agendas among the relevant actors with regard to the desired transformation. They consider factors that influence these 6 motivations and agendas." 11 They evaluate tendencies, tensions, and other factors that influence social, cultural, and ideological forces. 12 The organization also considers the human component through the lens of the cultural analytical framework, a construct which looks at culture, sociology and history to understand the motivations of humans.
To further understand and describe the environment and the human component, an organization next conducts a thorough systems-based process that considers all relationships using the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational and Infrastructure (PMESII) framework.
Though it may be apparent that doctrine, at least from a design standpoint, considers the human component in conflict, a disconnect arises when the military attempts to translate these factors from the language of strategic design down through campaigns and into operations executed by Soldiers on the ground that actually interact with humans. Human motivational factors easily become lost within the technical analysis when dissecting the elements of PMESII in broad operational language. A common framework that unites the basic factors of the human component, applicable to all levels of conflict and all consumers, is required. Additionally, even if the design methodology considers the human component, if it is not accounted for across the totality of military doctrine, it will continue to be overlooked or disregarded.
The Joint Operational Access Concept states that in the future, geographic access will be challenged, and to meet that threat "future joint forces will leverage crossdomain synergy." 13 The Access Concept acknowledges the fact that efforts must be definition. 15 The dictionary of military terms defines the maritime domain as "the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the air space above these, including the littorals" 16 and defines the air domain as "the atmosphere, beginning at the Notable in its absence from the strategy was a significant discussion on resolving a key element at the heart of the Afghan problem; the will of the people and their issue with the legitimacy of the Afghan government. 20 The National Security Strategy undertaking that does not respond to deterministic rules" and correctly labels human involvement and the specter of chance as the art of war. 24 The publication also discusses the fluid and dynamic nature of the strategic environment as consisting of "…continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new (both national and transnational) threats" 25 and reviews the religious, cultural and psychological challenges to multinational operations, but despite this, it still only accounts for the human component as a mere ingredient of the environment, not as a central and critical 9 component. 26 The same can be said of Joint Publication 3-0, Operations, which provides a brief discussion of the challenges of the strategic environment being driven by the human condition 27 and discusses how, "…successful commanders can strike a balance between the 'art of war' (human interaction) and the 'science of war' (technological solutions) by emphasizing the inherently human aspects of warfare." 28 Yet, despite this acceptance of the human component and its relation to the art of war, the publication does not possess a single chapter; heading or sub-heading that discusses the human component in war as the central theme and subject. Joint
Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, also fails to adequately account for the critical role of humanity in conflict. The publication states that the key to operational planning is the "…commander's description of the broad actions the force must take to achieve the desired military end state. The operational approach is based largely on an understanding of the operational environment and the problem." 29 As stated at the beginning of this section, joint doctrine has already defined the operating environment as consisting of numerous factors of the five domains and the information environment, but the planning publication fails to give the human component a central role in its doctrinal considerations. It isn't until the chapter on operational art and design, over one hundred pages into the publication, that the importance of the human component in determining centers of gravity is discussed. Like the joint operations publication and the joint planning publication, the bulk of joint doctrine does not include a single chapter or heading dedicated solely to the crucial human component in conflict.
US Army doctrine either overlooks or undervalues the importance of humanity in war. Doctrine, according to the Army Unified Land Operations publication, is "…a statement of how the Army intends to fight. In this sense, doctrine often describes an idealized situation and then contrasts the ideal with the reality Army leaders can expect.
Doctrine provides a means of conceptualizing campaigns and operations, as well as a detailed understanding of conditions, frictions, and uncertainties that make achieving the ideal difficult." 30 The logical assumption would be that because war is a conflict between humans, the human component would be featured relative to its importance.
The Department of the Army Operating Concept, designed to guide the US Army's efforts for the next eighteen years, discusses the human challenges of the future, including threats arising in diverse populations, extremist individuals and demographic trends. 31 The concept also highlights that "…human, psychological, political, and on an acknowledgment that 'we cannot predict with certainty the pattern of war for which we must prepare ourselves,' as well as in the final analysis 'the ultimate determination in war is the man on the scene with the gun'." 37 The concept states that due to a lack of prejudice over domains, the Corps is more willing to look past standard solutions and consider new techniques, methods and concepts. Accordingly, the What has happened has been a decisive shift in the trajectory of war, away from an evolution of greater machine technology back to the human domain. The technology our opponents use against us is widely available, including bombs, rockets, and sniper rifles. Further, the fight will be in the human domain of ideas and culture-by Web site and on Al Jazeera, in the minds of suicide bombers and those who fear them. Our advanced machines are not irrelevant in this war. But faced with limited resources, we must objectively assess our existing and emerging technologies to find those most effective in the human domain. 40 The human domain has been recently defined in a Special Operations white paper as the "…totality of the physical, cultural and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military campaign or operation depends on the application of unique capabilities that are defined to fight and win population-centric conflicts." 41 The Special Operations Command initiative to develop a human domain is based on the principle that a human domain is needed "…to focus Army efforts to address human factors external to our own forces in a manner similar to the Army's internal focus on the human dimension." 42 The current initiative would establish a human domain that is critical and complementary to the acknowledged domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber. 43 The proposed human domain, (5) bottom-up information and intelligence to identify all the pieces of the puzzle through the tactical, operational and strategic level. 47 Finally, the MCOE paper concludes with the salient point that a "…human domain, coupled with the land domain, is the crux for decisive action for our Army as the nation's strategic land power." 48 The Special
Operations Command and MCOE white paper arguments for a human domain are both compelling and correct, but they fail due to a lack of reach. In employing terminology already utilized in doctrine, the initiative implies that the human component is equal to the other existing domains. In the words of the initiative stated above; the human domain would be critical and complementary to the acknowledged domains of land, maritime, air, space and cyber. 49 But it is the human component that provides the existing domains value and dominates them. To create a framework that is complementary and equal to the existing domains is to create an evolution in Army doctrine, when what is required is a revolutionary paradigm shift.
The Recommendation for a Human Realm
Is it necessary, then, to revise doctrine to include a Human Realm when the human component is already considered when assessing the environment? After considering history and existing military publications, the United States needs to revise doctrine to capture the lessons learned in the past and place the proper emphasis on the human component, and the arguments stated above support this proposal. Does the current initiative to create a human domain provide this emphasis? As stated previously, the desire to create a human domain, while important, is an evolutionary step to highlight the human component in conflict. As Francis Bacon said, "It would be an unused fancy and self-contradictory to expect that things which have never yet been done can be done except by means which have never yet been tried." 50 A revolution in doctrine is necessary to do things which have not been done, correct errors of the past and capture the imaginations of strategic leaders and the military profession.
What is required in doctrine is not merely another domain that incorporates the human component, but an entirely new construct that places the human component in a fundamental and guiding role running from the national strategic level down to the tactical squad on the ground, and simultaneously unifies the existing domains. The National Defense University Strategic Forum highlights the central role of the human component in future conflicts, and emphasizes the requirement to adjust doctrine to meet the challenges of the future. 51 The article stressed that in the future gaining access to global commons will be difficult, influenced by an increasingly linked world that creates interrelated domains. 52 Additionally, the article states that "the traditional approach to military concept development for the global commons has been domaincentric (maritime, air, space, and so forth). This planning construct, one of geographic 'stovepipes,' does not properly account for the complexities of domain interrelationships." 53 What the article proposes is a new paradigm that seeks synergy by recognizing the interrelationship between the domains. 54 
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A Human Realm would not only emphasize the preeminent place the human component holds in war, but could focus the existing domains within it as a framework for all planning. It would provide a counter to a traditional Pentagon planning process that Michele Flournoy, of the Center for a New American Security, recently criticized as being "unsatisfactory" and "stale" and might help avoid a Vietnam syndrome in the future. 55 A Human Realm paradigm that analyzes specific vital aspects of the human component first and foremost, and is applicable to all levels of planning from strategy to tactics, would create a common vision and unity of effort, two critical aspects to mission success. It would support General Dempsey's recent observation in his strategic guidance that "we need innovation in how we operate -our ability to re-imagine the way we fight will determine if we succeed or fail." 
Conclusion
The US Army and the Special Operations Command both understand the lessons of the past and are working to emerge from the recent conflict a more adaptable, capable and agile force. The entire military profession concedes the fact that the future holds a multitude of challenges, some which the military and the nation are prepared to face, and many which will require growth and adaptation to overcome.
An initiative that places the human component at the forefront of conflict is already well underway in the Army and within the Special Operations community. While this initiative is a positive and necessary step, it is neither radical nor far reaching enough to help generate a true revolution in military thought. Accordingly and in conclusion, doctrine must be revised to incorporate the concept of a Human Realm to face the uncertain challenges of a future environment that will be dominated, as it always has
